Case in 2017: some thoughts

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Workshop in Honor of David Pesetsky’s 60th Birthday
What I have to say…

(i) enough with Abstract Case already
(ii) so-called “m-case” is **syntactic**
(iii) nominative ≡ the absence of case
(iv) only 2 kinds of real(≡ non-nominative) case:
    dependent case, and case assigned under closest-c-command by $H^0$
Abstract Case: what it’s supposed to be

- A theory of the distribution of overt nominals
  - motivated by data like these:

  (1) John tried (*Bill/*himself*/him) to win.
  (2) John is fond *(of) Mary.
  (3) the destruction *(of) the city
  (4) It is impossible *(for) Bill to win.


- Abstract Case has nothing to say about data like the following:

  (5) a. John is fond of/*for Mary.
      b. the destruction of/*for the city
      c. It is impossible for/*of Bill to win.

  - these are typically handled by an appeal to c-selection
But c-selection is not only necessary to account for data like (6a–c) —
(6)  a. John is fond \{ of/*for/*Ø \} Mary.
    b. the destruction \{ of/*for/*Ø \} the city
    c. It is impossible \{ for/*of/*Ø \} Bill to win.
— it is also sufficient (Sundaresan & McFadden 2009).

⇒ That leaves (1):
(1) John tried (*Bill/*himself*/him) to win.
   ○ but Abstract Case is not a particularly interesting or successful account of (1)…
wager-verbs (Pesetsky 1991, Postal 1974)

- There is a class of verbs which take an infinitival complement —
  - for which having an “in situ” subject of that infinitive is impossible:

(7)  * John wagered Secretariat to win.

- but passive(≡A-movement) allows this same noun phrase to be overt:

(8)  Secretariat was wagered \( t \) to win.

- And, crucially, so does A-bar movement:

(9)  Which horse did John wager \( t \) to win?
wager-verbs (Pesetsky 1991, Postal 1974) (cont.)

(7) * John wagered Secretariat to win.
(8) Secretariat was wagered $t$ to win.
(9) Which horse did John wager $t$ to win?

- Importantly, the theory of Abstract Case must maintain that A-bar movement is “Case-neutral” —

(10) * Mary asked who John tried $t$ to win.

- otherwise examples like (10) are predicted to be okay

**NB:** On the Abstract Case theory, both *ask* and *try* (or clauses where these are the main verbs) must be considered viable “Case assigners”:

(11) a. Mary asked [a question].
    b. John tried [the pie].

⇒ the movement in (10) should, all else being equal, bring the moving phrase into the domain of Case assignment
wager-verbs (Pesetsky 1991, Postal 1974) (cont.)

(7) * John wagered Secretariat to win.
(8) Secretariat was wagered \( t \) to win.
(9) Which horse did John wager \( t \) to win?

• Given that A-bar movement is Case-neutral, the contrast between (7) and (9) cannot be Case-theoretic;

\[ \Rightarrow \] There must be a separate constraint at play, ruling out (7).
Infinitives reconsidered

- The badness of (7) is a subcase of a broader pattern:

\[(12)\hspace{1em}\textit{infinitival subjects} \ldots\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>that are “in situ”</th>
<th>that have vacated by A-mvmt</th>
<th>that have vacated by A-bar mvmt</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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John expected Secretariat to win.
Secretariat was expected \( t \) to win.
Which horse did John expect \( t \) to win?

- * John wagered Secretariat to win.
  Secretariat was wagered \( t \) to win.
  Which horse did John wager \( t \) to win?

- * John tried Secretariat to win.
  * Secretariat was tried \( t \) to win.
  * Which horse did John try \( t \) to win?

- things marked with a red circle cannot be accounted for with Abstract Case

- in terms of scientific method, inventing a sui generis explanation \textit{just} for the boxed cell is just about the last thing we should entertain.
A note on the Case Filter

- In Chomsky (2000, 2001), the Case Filter is recapitulated as checking condition on ‘uninterpretable’ Case features located on D(P)
  - the idea being that you get the Case Filter “for free” from the assumption that Case is a feature — because:

  (13) unchecked/unvalued/undeleted features cause a “crash”(=ungrammaticality) at the interfaces.

⇒ Preminger 2014: (13) is demonstrably false

⇒ Whatever you want to say about the Case Filter, you certainly can no longer say it comes “for free” from the mechanisms of feature-checking/valuation.
What else does(n’t) Abstract Case do?

- **Obligatory A-movement (as in passives & raising)?**
  - even if we were to adopt the theory of Abstract Case —
    - there are well-established cases of obligatory A-movement that cannot possibly be explained in terms of this theory
  - ex.: Object Shift (in Scandinavian)
    - involves obligatory A-movement from positions that Abstract Case theory would have to characterize as already-Case-marked (as evinced by the behavior of the shifted nominals’ non-specific / non-pronominal / ... counterparts, which do not shift)

⇒ even Abstract Case theory must resort to an obligatory A-movement operation having nothing to do with “Case”; therefore —
  - obligatory A-movement in passives & raising is in no way an argument in favor of Abstract Case.
What else does(n’t) Abstract Case do? (cont.)

- Determine (or help determine) morphological form?
  - Abstract Case has nothing to do with overt case morphology
    - some would point out that Abstract Case often makes the right predictions concerning overt case
      - I actually think that’s a gross idealization;
      - but even if we grant it, it’s hardly redeeming
    - our criterion for a successful theory isn’t, and shouldn’t be, “X gets a lot of the facts right”
    - associationist/connectionist approaches to language get a lot of the facts right, too
      - but that doesn’t lead us to adopt Google Translate as our theory of grammar
What else does(n’t) Abstract Case do? (cont.)

- We generativists see a profundity in the kinds of errors that associationist/connectionist systems make
  - And we take these errors to be indicative that the logic of these systems is fundamentally off

- Look no further than Icelandic to see that, when it comes to overt case morphology, the logic of Abstract Case is fundamentally off
  - An observation that has been around since the late-80s, by the way
most importantly, if you look at what one does need to say to accurately predict case morphology —

(probably some version of configurational case assignment)

— you get a system that:

(i) makes no reference to whatsoever to the primitives of Abstract Case

(ii) is (much) simpler than what you’d need to say to “fix” the morphological mispredictions that Abstract Case generates

— cf. Legate 2008

⇒ and so I think I am entirely justified when I say that Abstract Case is of no use whatsoever in predicting overt case morphology
In closing...

*Enough already with Abstract Case.*
So-called “m-case”

- What it refers to:
  - an empirically adequate system that determines the case of nominals
    - in a way that actually matches what we see in languages with case morphology
  - includes dependent case ⇒ is (at least partially) configurational
    - what that means: case is assigned to (some) noun phrases by virtue of their structural relation to other noun phrases
      - not (just) by virtue of their structural relation to designated functional heads
So-called “m-case” (cont.)

- Marantz (1991): m-case is, well, morphological
  - what he means by this:
    - it is computed on the PF branch, after the PF-LF split
      - in the same part of the derivation where what we (pre-theoretically) call ‘morphology’ is
  - what he does not mean by this:
    - m-case only exists where it is morpho-phonologically visible
      (more on this shortly)

- This statement about the modular locus of m-case is justified in terms of the following claim:

(14) There are no properties that must be located in syntax proper and which make unambiguous reference to m-case.  
[Marantz 1991]
4) There are no properties that must be located in syntax proper and which make unambiguous reference to m-case. \[\text{Marantz 1991}\]

Claim (14) is false.

- Bobaljik (2008): agreement in $\varphi$-features (PERSON, NUMBER, GENDER/NOUN-CLASS) requires unambiguous reference to m-case
  - in a way that cannot be subsumed by ‘grammatical function’, ‘theta role’, ‘position’, etc.

- Preminger 2014: movement to canonical subject position (in a subset of languages) requires unambiguous reference to agreement in $\varphi$-features
  - moreover, movement to canonical subject position has LF consequences (e.g. it is scope-expanding)

⇒ both agreement in $\varphi$-features and m-case must reside within syntax proper.
An all-too-frequent caricature of m-case

In the literature, m-case is often simply interpreted as: “case you can see(=hear)”

It is abundantly clear that this cannot be right; here’s why:

- one of the crowning achievements of m-case is correctly predicting the distribution of nominative case in Icelandic
- in particular, the fact that when the subject is exceptionally ACC/DAT/GEN —
  - the object gets marked with NOM instead of the usual ACC
- as noted by Bobaljik (2008), finite agreement in Icelandic tracks NOM
- now, several nominal paradigms (incl. pronouns) in Icelandic show various cross-case syncretisms
- but a (syntactically) non-NOM subject in Icelandic that happens to be (morphologically) syncretic with its NOM counterpart is not suddenly able to control agreement
In other words, **m-case** is itself an abstract system of categories

- that may or may not be exponed in a way that tracks every single syntactically-relevant distinction

- Or, to put it in the form of a slogan: “**m-case** is abstract.”
‘Nominative’: the traditional view

• The traditional view of ‘nominative’ —
  (no doubt inspired by older philological traditions, but largely persistent to this day)
  — takes ‘nominative’ to be an extant grammatical primitive.

• One then finds various discussions in the literature about how & when nominative is “assigned”
  ◦ see, e.g., Chomsky 1981 et seq.

>> I have argued that this is fundamentally mistaken…
‘Nominative’ as caselessness

Preminger 2014, Kornfilt & Preminger 2015:

(i) **Everything preempts nominative**

Viewing (m-)case assignment as run-of-the-mill feature valuation, and ‘nominative’ as caselessness —

we derive the fact, which had to be stipulated in Marantz 1991, that nominative comes “last” in the case assignment hierarchy

- if ‘nominative’ ≡ “my case features have not been valued”:
  - ⇒ any contentful assignment of case to a nominal would make it impossible for that nominal to subsequently be ‘nominative’
    - ○ this is precisely the kind of preemption that Marantz had to stipulate as part of his *disjunctive case hierarchy*
  - ➡ and remember: we already know that features remaining unvalued through the end of the derivation is okay (Preminger 2014)
‘Nominative’ as caselessness (cont.)

(ii) Raising-to-ACC

(15) a. \( \text{min} \) ehigi\(_1\)-ni [ bügün \( t_1 \) kyaj-yax-xyt \( \text{dien} \) erem-mit-im

\( \text{you} \)-ACC today \( \text{win} \)-FUT-2pl.SUBJ that \( \text{hope} \)-PST-1sg.SUBJ

‘I hoped you would win today.’

b. ehigi bihigi\(_1\)-ni[ \( t_1 \) kyajtar-dy-byt \( \text{dien} \) xomoj-du-gut

\( \text{you} \) we-ACC lose-PST-1pl.SUBJ that \( \text{become.sad} \)-PST-2pl.SUBJ

‘Y’all were disappointed that we lost.’

[\( \text{Sakha (Turkic); V05:369} \)]

• these are instances of raising per se (Baker & Vinokurova 2010)

⇒ the trigger for subject-agreement in the embedded clause is the very nominal that shows up bearing ACC in the matrix

• outside of this construction, subject agreement in Sakha adheres to a strict NOM ⇔ finite agr generalization

⇒ how and why is that generalization violated here?
(15) a. min ehigi₁-ni [ bügün $t_1$ kyaj-yax-xyt ] dien erem-mit-im
  you-ACC today win-FUT-2pl.SUBJ that hope-PST-1sg.SUBJ
  ‘I hoped you would win today.’

  b. ehigi bihigi₁-ni [ $t_1$ kyajtar-dy-byt ] dien xomoj-du-gut
  you we-ACC lose-PST-1pl.SUBJ that become.sad-PST-2pl.SUBJ
  ‘Y’all were disappointed that we lost.’ [Sakha (Turkic); V05:369]

• A reasonable solution: the relevant nominals go from being nominative
  (in the embedded clause) to being accusative (in the matrix)
  ○ Baker & Vinokurova (2010): they do so by means of “case-stacking”

(16) [[[DP]-NOM]-ACC]
does not allow already-case-marked nominals to participate in
subsequent dependent case relations
(15) a. min ehigi₁-ni [ bugün t₁ kyaj-yax-xyt ] dien erem-mit-im
    you-ACC today win-FUT-2pl.SUBJ that hope-PST-1sg.SUBJ
    ‘I hoped you would win today.’

b. ehigi bihigi₁-ni [ t₁ kyajtar-dy-byt ] dien xomoj-du-gut
    you we-ACC lose-PST-1pl.SUBJ that become.sad-PST-2pl.SUBJ
    ‘Y’all were disappointed that we lost.’

- since ACC in Sakha is dependent case, the only way something can
  “become ACC” is if it was previously caseless
- and that’s what being nominative is.
Other types of (m-)case

- So we’ve seen that so-called ‘nominative’ is just the absence of case;
- And we’ve mentioned dependent case —
  - case is assigned to a noun phrase by virtue of its structural proximity to another as-of-yet-caseless noun phrase
  ⇒ What else is there?
- For Marantz 1991, there is only one other category: lexically governed case
  - which, for him, meant case assigned to a nominal by the head that selects it
• For Marantz, *lexically governed case* must preempt *dependent case*
  ○ in Preminger 2014, I showed that viewing (m-)case assignment as run-of-the-mill valuation derives this instance of preemption, as well

• That’s because, on a bottom-up model of structure building —

(17)

• the sisterhood relation in question will obtain *before* the necessary configuration for *DEPENDENT* case assignment
However, I no longer think this story is correct — or rather, I don’t think it is complete.

For one thing, there are certain kinds of case that Marantz’s (1991) system, as stated, is a very poor fit for:

- most notably, case associated with prepositional complementizers
  - which is a very poor fit for dependent case, but is assigned to a nominal not selected by the prepositional complementizer

As a result, I no longer think lexical(ly governed) case should be restricted to the sisterhood relation

- rather, it is case associated with the lexical identity of a particular head, and assigned under closest-c-command
Other types of (m-)case (cont.)

- When *lexical case* is discharged under sisterhood —
  - the earlier results (preemption of *dependent case*) still obtain

- But now we can account for case assigned by prepositional complementizers

- As well as . . . *case in English!*

(18) a. $\text{He}_{c1}$ is here on time.
   
   b. $\text{Her}_{c2}$ and $\text{him}_{c2}$ are here on time.

- I’m assuming, with Sobin (1997), that the other forms are just prescriptive (hyper)correction
  - that they exist doesn’t mean we should shove them in the grammar
  - any more than the existence of “*Numeral NP do/does not a NP make*” means we should make the grammar of English verb-final
(18) a. \( He_{c1} \) is here on time.

b. \( Her_{c2} \) and \( him_{c2} \) are here on time.

Note, importantly, that \( c1 \) has nothing to do with agreement:

(19) a. I demand that \( he_{c1} \) be here on time.

b. I demand that \( her_{c2} \) and \( him_{c2} \) be here on time.

\[ c1 \] is case assigned by \( T^0 \) under closest-c-command;

\[ c2 \] is caselessness (\( \equiv \) unmarked case)

- in other words, insofar as English has anything you’d want to call ‘nominative’ —
  - it’s \( c2 \), i.e., the thing we’ve been calling ‘accusative’ or ‘objective’ case
Happy Birthday David!

And thank you all for listening!


